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Abstract 
This paper argues that the lack of timely and decisive policy action to correct domestic 
and external imbalances contributed crucially to the build-up of financial excesses that led to 
the financial crisis and the Great Recession. We focus on 2002-07 and perform a number of 
counterfactual simulations to investigate two central elements of the story, namely: (a) an 
over-expansionary US monetary policy and the absence of effective macro-prudential 
supervision, which permitted a prolonged expansion of debt-financed consumer spending; 
(b) the decision of China and other emerging countries to pursue an export-led growth 
strategy supported by pegging their currencies to the US dollar, resulting in a huge build-up 
of their official reserves, in conjunction with sluggish domestic demand in surplus advanced 
economies characterized by low potential output growth. The results of the simulations lend 
support to the view that if substantial, globally coordinated demand rebalancing had been 
undertaken in a timely manner, the macroeconomic and financial imbalances would not have 
accumulated to the extent that they did and the financial turmoil might have had less drastic 
global consequences.  
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While the trigger and the proximate causes of the crisis that has rocked the global economy since
the summer of 2007 were essentially ￿nancial, it has become increasingly clear that macroeconomic
imbalances were a central part of the complex set of circumstances that lay at its root. In particular,
the ￿nancial excesses that led to the piling up and underestimation of risks could not have become
so widespread if the macroeconomic environment had not been characterized by large saving-
investment imbalances, very low interest rates and substantial asset price misalignments. In the
general climate of hype that those macroeconomic conditions permitted, supervisory and regulatory
failures allowed ￿nancial innovations to generate serious dysfunctions in the US and global ￿nancial
systems. Moreover, the lopsided composition of global ￿nal demand in the years preceding the crisis,
with most of the world ultimately relying on US consumer spending, essentially ￿nanced by growing
mortgage debt, made the world economy extremely vulnerable to a shock ￿the downturn in the
US housing market ￿that called this central factor of the global expansion into question. If this
key source of fragility is not borne in mind, it is di¢ cult to explain fully the sharp and highly
synchronized contraction of world trade and the collapse of global con￿dence that characterized
the propagation of the global recession.
In this paper we argue that the lack of su¢ ciently decisive policy reactions to the domestic
and external imbalances was crucial: if those imbalances had been eliminated, the ￿nancial turmoil
would have had lesser far-reaching consequences. Over the 10-15 years that preceded the crisis
it was indeed already possible to identify a number of signals of macroeconomic stress, which
interacted with ￿ aws in the ￿nancial system to create very signi￿cant, though at the time partly
hidden, ￿nancial fragilities.1
These signals consisted in: the dramatic fall in the US household saving rate, from around 7
per cent in the early 1990s to close to zero in 2005-07; a sharp increase in US and global liquidity,
which largely re￿ ected the generally accommodating monetary conditions in the United States; the
continuous widening of global imbalances, already recognized as hard to sustain in the late 1990s;
an enormous increase in o¢ cial reserves, mainly in emerging Asia and the oil-exporting countries,
which mostly pegged their currencies to the US dollar; very low levels of long-term interest rates
and asset price volatility after 2003; and a sequence of asset price bubbles in the United States and
globally, starting with the dot-com bubble of the late 1990s, followed by an unusually synchronized
global housing price boom.
Essentially, these disequilibria re￿ ected rapid and sustained growth in ￿nal demand, especially
consumption demand, in the United States, ￿nanced by over-borrowing, primarily from abroad.
This occurred in a global context of excess saving that compressed real interest rates to abnormally
low levels compared with average GDP growth. If the United States served as a sort of ￿consumer
of last resort￿ , other large advanced and emerging economies implicitly or explicitly followed an
1See Visco (2009, 2010).
5export-led growth strategy, which is di¢ cult to maintain inde￿nitely but also di¢ cult to abandon.
In order to reduce the risk that macroeconomic imbalances and distortions in the ￿nancial
system might again combine to produce large-scale, devastating ￿nancial crises in the future, it is
essential to address both elements. Important changes in ￿nancial market regulation and banking
supervision are already being introduced. In the macroeconomic ￿eld, an e⁄ort is being made to
strengthen economic policy coordination in the context of the G-20. However, it is also necessary
to review how macroeconomic policies are conducted in light of the experience of the crisis. Two
areas where a rethinking is already under way are monetary policy frameworks ￿and, in particular,
how and to what extent they should take into account asset market developments and associated
￿nancial fragilities ￿and exchange rate arrangements.
In this paper we focus on the period 2002-07, before the start of the ￿nancial turmoil that
evolved into the global crisis, and perform several counterfactual simulations to investigate two
central elements of the story, namely: (a) an overly expansionary monetary policy and lax supervi-
sory policy in the United States, which may have permitted a prolonged expansion of debt-￿nanced
consumer spending; (b) the decision of China and other emerging countries to pursue an export-led
growth strategy supported by pegging their currencies to the US dollar, resulting in a huge build-up
of their o¢ cial reserves, in conjunction with other advanced economies characterized by low rates
of growth in potential output.
To investigate whether di⁄erent policy choices could have prevented, or at least moderated,
the build-up of disequilibria, we use the National Institute of Economic and Social Research￿ s large-
scale global macroeconomic model (NiGEM). NiGEM is an estimated model, whose framework is
￿neo-Keynesian￿in the sense that agents￿choices may be assumed to be forward-looking, but with
nominal rigidities that slow the process of adjustment to shocks. Financial asset prices are normally
assumed to be forward-looking, and a⁄ect consumer demand via wealth e⁄ects. Monetary policy
can be set according to alternative interest rate feedback rules.2
Model simulations were conducted to provide a quantitative assessment of the e⁄ects of
the di⁄erent policy choices mentioned above. We report the results as answers to the following
questions:
1. Was US monetary policy too expansionary for too long in the wake of the 2001 recession?
Would a tighter monetary stance have prevented (or at least contained) the housing bubble?
2. Would stricter ￿nancial supervision or the use of a macro-prudential policy instrument, acting
via the cost of credit, have helped to prevent or contain the bubble?
3. Would the combination of monetary policy tightening and a macro-prudential tool have been
e⁄ective in dampening house prices? Would it have also helped in reducing the US external
2The main model properties of NiGEM are discussed in Barrell et al. (2004). The structure of the main equations
of the model can be found on the Niesr website (www.niesr.ac.uk).
6imbalance?
4. What would have been the e⁄ect on US housing prices and America￿ s current account im-
balance of an increase in potential output in Japan and Europe and a major rebalancing
towards domestic demand (with an appreciation of the currencies that were being pegged to
the dollar) in emerging Asia?
5. Would the combination of tighter US policies and a major demand rebalancing (and currency
appreciation) in surplus economies have been able simultaneously to address both the US
domestic imbalance (housing bubble) and global imbalances?
Overall, our results highlight the complementarity of policy actions in the United States and
in surplus countries with respect to the correction of both internal US and global imbalances. In this
sense, they support the fundamental assumption underlying the current e⁄orts to rebalance global
demand in the context of the G-20 Framework for strong, sustainable and balanced growth (G-20,
2009). The results lend support to the view that if substantial and globally coordinated demand
rebalancing had been undertaken in a timely manner, the imbalances would not have accumulated
to the extent that they did. Although it is hard to say whether in that scenario the ￿nancial crisis
might have been avoided, its propagation would probably have been less destructive because both
the US ￿nancial system and the global economy would have been less vulnerable to it.
In the remainder of the paper, we ￿rst review the debate in the literature (Section 2) and
the sequence of events that led to the global crisis (Section 3). We then provide an overview of the
model and of the simulation design (Section 4). Section 5 reports the results of the simulations and
Section 6 concludes.
2 The literature
Whether US monetary policy has been too expansionary for too long is at the centre of a heated
debate. In his paper at 2007 Jackson Hole Conference, John Taylor considered two alternative
paths for the federal funds rate: the one actually observed and a counterfactual path that he
considered to be closer to an optimal response (Taylor, 2007). On the basis of a simple model of
housing starts as a function of lagged interest rates, Taylor accounted for the boom and subsequent
bust in housing, although less pronounced than the one actually observed in the data. With a
counterfactual simulation he then showed that, had the Fed simply adhered from 2002 to 2005 to
the standard ￿Taylor rule￿ , the federal funds rate would have been raised more quickly and the
boom and bust in housing starts would have been considerably mitigated. In other words, Taylor￿ s
counterfactual simulations suggest that the excessively low interest rates set by the Fed were a key
cause of the unsustainable housing boom. Similarly, Papell (2010) suggests that the target federal
7funds interest rate was too low in 2003-05 even if one uses the real-time GDP de￿ ator in the Taylor
rule.
On the other hand, in his speech at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association,
Bernanke (2010) claims that if one considers the information available at the time (and especially
current estimates of the output gap) monetary policy played at most a modest role in the US housing
bubble; consequently, ￿nancial regulatory policy should be the appropriate tool for preventing
harmful asset price bubbles in the future. In a similar vein, Svensson (2010) argues that, given the
information available, there was a genuine and well-motivated fear of the US economy falling into
a Japanese-style de￿ ationary liquidity trap, so that a highly expansionary monetary policy would
have likely been optimal in such a situation. It may be that the risk of de￿ ation was exaggerated,
but there was no way to know this ex ante.
At bottom, this is the old controversy on whether monetary policy should react to asset
price misalignments.3 The arguments asserting that short-term interest rates may be ill-suited
for this task point out that the impact of a rise in short-term interest rates on the risk-taking
propensity of ￿nancial market agents cannot be predicted with certainty. When risk premia are
adjusting rapidly, whether upwards or downwards, risk-free rates may be an ine⁄ective instrument
for in￿ uencing risk-taking behaviour (Kohn, 2008). Furthermore, to rein in the growth in banks￿
balance sheets, monetary policy would probably have needed to throttle economic activity to a pace
below that consistent with price stability. This would have resulted in lower output relative to trend
and higher unemployment over the period in question. Finally, using interest rates to lean against
asset bubbles can de-anchor the private sector￿ s in￿ ation expectations. Persistent deviations of
in￿ ation from target can make the central bank￿ s commitment to return in￿ ation to target in the
medium term more arduous.
It has been suggested that in order to take the e⁄ects of asset price movements into account in
a ￿ exible in￿ ation-targeting framework, central banks may need to look further into the future than
is normally the case.4 But since forecasts can only become less precise as the time horizon extends,
it is debatable whether trade-o⁄s that depend on forecasts of the distant future and are inherently
rather uncertain can be stable enough to provide reliable guidance for current policy decisions.
Furthermore, this may be too general a framework to provide actual guidance to monetary policy.
If allowed to develop, asset price bubbles and the ￿nancial instability that usually accompanies
them can eventually destabilize expectations about future monetary policy and in￿ ation, especially
if authorities invariably ￿clean up￿once a bubble has burst by easing policy as much as necessary
to o⁄set the e⁄ects on the economy. Here the crucial point is that the models we use to interpret
economic data and to set policy are largely linear, do not pay su¢ cient attention to leverage,
probabilities of default and banks￿balance sheets, and are particularly de￿cient in their treatment
of asset prices.
3See, for example, Borio and Lowe (2002).
4See, for example, Bean (2003).
8Recent IMF research (IMF, 2009; Kannan, Rabanal and Scott, 2009) shows that in some
countries there was some correlation between loose monetary policy and house price rises in the
years leading up to the crisis, but loose monetary policy was not the main, systematic cause of
the boom and consequent bust. However, simulation results suggest that a stronger emphasis on
macro￿nancial risk could provide stabilization bene￿ts. Strong monetary reactions to accelerator
mechanisms that push up credit growth and asset prices could help macroeconomic stability, but
a macro-prudential instrument designed speci￿cally to dampen credit market cycles would also be
useful. Nevertheless, invariant and rigid policy responses that do not consider the source of the
shock (e.g. ￿nancial vs. real) raise the risk of policy errors that could destabilize the economy
instead of stabilizing it. Hence, discretion would be required.
Other interpretations of the build-up of the crisis emphasize the role of excess saving outside
the United States and the channeling of these resources into Treasuries, which put downward
pressure on interest rates (e.g. Bernanke, 2009). Low interest rates triggered a search for yield,
and the attendant squeezing of risk premia tended to make ￿nancial conditions even more favourable
for a broad range of borrowers, feeding the house price bubble.
Several explanations have been put forward to rationalize the impact of global savings on long-
term interest rates. One strand of this literature, originated by Bernanke (2005), starts out from
the reaction of emerging Asian countries to the 1997-98 crisis. The sudden stop in capital in￿ ows
and the sharp recession forced Asian countries hit by the crisis to reduce their external de￿cits.
Further, the crisis induced these countries to assign a high priority to accumulating o¢ cial reserves
as a bu⁄er against possible capital out￿ ows. The rapid improvement in their current account
positions was assisted by substantial currency depreciation. In several countries the counterpart
was a sharp drop in investment (IMF, 2005). In China, however, which had escaped a currency
crisis, there was an exceptional increase in saving after 2002. The formation outside the United
States of what came to be alternatively called a ￿saving glut￿or an ￿investment drought￿is seen
as consistent with the observation that, roughly in the same years, real long-term interest rates
worldwide declined to historically low levels and current account imbalances widened dramatically.
Overall, the ￿excess saving￿approach does not explain why emerging countries would channel
their additional savings into portfolios biased towards a few assets (mainly US Treasury paper).
This is made explicit in the ￿Bretton Woods II￿analysis (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber,
2003), which emphasizes the deliberate maintenance of undervalued exchange rates pegged to the
dollar as part of an export-led growth strategy. This second strand of literature also starts out from
the behaviour of a number of emerging countries (not only in Asia) in the aftermath of the Asian
crisis, but it focuses primarily on the excessive build-up of foreign exchange reserves. In addition
to the emerging economies￿need to guard against the risk of capital account crises, other possible
explanations of the rapid reserve accumulation that have been given include the need to provide
investors from advanced economies with some kind of ￿collateral￿against major direct investment
projects or, alternatively, deliberate ￿mercantilist￿strategies of promoting export-led growth based
on price competitiveness.
9An alternative interpretation of emerging countries￿accumulation of reserve assets is found
in a more recent strand of the literature (Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas, 2008), which focuses on
￿nancial globalization, viewed as an ongoing endogenous process of integration between countries
at di⁄erent stages of ￿nancial development. According to this view, the United States￿unrivalled
comparative advantage in terms of ￿nancial market deepness, liquidity and legal infrastructure
and its position at the ￿nancial core of a rapidly integrating world enable it to attract ￿nancial
investments from fast-growing industrializing economies, which are unable themselves to produce
the ￿nancial assets needed to store wealth safely. Excess demand for high-quality assets in the
periphery thus translates into a global shortage of assets that forces the core country, the United
States, into a structural equilibrium characterized by persistent current account de￿cits and low
long-term real interest rates.
More recently, it has been suggested that only a much broader set of interrelated factors ￿
macroeconomic as well as ￿nancial ￿could have generated a crisis of such magnitude (Visco, 2009).
Along similar lines, Bean (2009) concludes that ￿it would be a mistake to look for a single guilty
culprit. Underestimation of risk born of the Great Moderation, loose monetary policy in the United
States and a perverse pattern of international capital ￿ ows together provided fertile territory for
the emergence of a credit/asset-price bubble￿ . Similarly, Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2009) argue that
the global imbalances of the 2000s and the global crisis are intimately connected. Both have their
origins in the economic policies followed in a number of countries in the 2000s and in distortions
that in￿ uenced the transmission of these policies through the United States and ultimately global
￿nancial markets. The interaction among the Fed￿ s monetary stance, global real interest rates,
credit market distortions, and ￿nancial innovation created the toxic mix of conditions that made
the United States the epicentre of the global ￿nancial crisis. Outside the United States, exchange
rate and other economic policies followed by emerging markets such as China contributed to the
United States￿ability to borrow cheaply abroad and thereby ￿nance its unsustainable housing
bubble.
3 Narrative: the build-up of external and internal imbalances and
the role of policies
The postulate of this paper is that policies played a signi￿cant role in sustaining this pattern of
unbalanced growth. To be sure, the pattern dates back to the early-1990s, when geopolitical shocks
such as the end of the Cold War and technological shocks like the advent of new information and
communications technologies hit the global economy. But its economic consequences were magni￿ed
a decade later, with the integration of China in the world trading system and the acceleration of
￿nancial globalization. To illustrate the role of policies in creating the conditions that eventually
led to the global recession, it will be useful to review the sequence of events that marked the last
decade.
101. The recessionary e⁄ects of the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000-01 were compounded by
the severe shock of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. The Federal Reserve￿ s response
was very rapid and accommodating. The drastic reduction in interest rates was accompanied
by a strongly expansionary budgetary policy. Monetary policy remained expansionary for a
protracted period, facilitating a return to sustained growth in household consumption. The
associated decline in the saving rate to close to zero in mid-2000s corresponded to the rise
in household sector net worth (Figure 1). A crucial element motivating this policy was the
￿de￿ ation scare￿of 2002-03, when the Fed became highly concerned that monetary policy
risked becoming ine⁄ective in a low-in￿ ation environment (Ahearne et al., 2002). With the
bene￿t of hindsight, it has been argued that in that period, thanks to the credit and housing
channel, US monetary policy had become more powerful than before (e.g. Muellbauer, 2007)
and that, therefore, the federal funds rate was kept too low for too long (Figure 2). This
conclusion would apply a fortiori insofar as policy should have reacted to risks to ￿nancial
stability, which were not being adequately countered by regulatory policies and prudential
supervision.
2. By supporting domestic demand, the expansionary US monetary (and ￿scal) stance con-
tributed to an unsustainable widening of the US external de￿cit, matched by growing sur-
pluses in major emerging economies. The current account de￿cit deteriorated from around
2 per cent of GDP in mid-1996 ￿close to the average over the previous twenty years ￿to
almost 6 per cent in 2006. Fiscal policy, which turned very expansionary after 2000, largely
o⁄set the sharp increase in corporate net saving as the investment boom ended. Households,
already net borrowers in the late 1990s, ran increasingly larger saving de￿cits as the housing
boom got under way (Mian and Su￿, 2010). The powerful expansion in US ￿nal demand and
imports supported the increasingly rapid growth of exports and output in the major emerging
economies. The growing US current account de￿cit was accompanied by ever larger surpluses
in emerging economies and in Japan. A signi￿cant build-up of o¢ cial reserves occurred in
a context of relatively sluggish growth in domestic demand and, especially in China, of sav-
ing rates even higher than the elevated rates of ￿xed investment. Oil-producing countries
also recorded surging trade surpluses, as oil prices were driven up by the expansion of global
demand. The unsustainability of these growing current account imbalances was already an
issue in the late 1990s; afterwards, only a succession of favourable valuation e⁄ects (after
2001, mostly due to the dollar￿ s depreciation) contained the otherwise explosive deterioration
in the US net debtor position (Figure 3).
3. A number of Asian and oil-exporting countries that pegged their currencies to the dollar
accumulated very substantial o¢ cial reserves (Figure 4). Their investment in US Treasury
paper contributed to lower long-term interest rates. It also facilitated the ￿nancing of the
growing US current account de￿cit, whose composition shifted, after the dot-com bubble
burst, from mostly private ￿ ows (FDI and portfolio equity) to o¢ cial capital ￿ ows coming
from countries with limited exchange rate ￿ exibility. The accumulation of o¢ cial reserves
accelerated as China and other emerging countries continued to peg their currencies to the





















































































































































Other nonfinancial assets Equity Financial assets other than equity
Real estate assets of households Financial liabilities Saving rate (rhs)
Net worth
Source: Federal Reserve (Flow of Funds) and Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Notes: quarterly; per cent of disposable income. Other nonfinancial assets include tangible assets owned by non-profit organizations and
consumer durables.
Figure 2: The target rate and the Taylor rule prescriptions using real-time GDP de￿ ator in￿ ation
Source: Papell (2010).
Notes: solid line: target rate; dashed line: implied federal funds rate
12dollar, which started to depreciate in 2002. Almost 70 per cent of the total increase in foreign
exchange reserves registered between 1998 and 2007 is ascribable to emerging Asian and oil-
exporting economies. The consensus opinion is that capital in￿ ows lowered long-term US
rates by less than one percentage point (Craine and Martin, 2009; Warnock and Warnock,
2006).
4. Low interest rates triggered a search for yield, which squeezed risk premia as long-term rates
declined signi￿cantly more than the expected future pro￿le of short-term rates (Figure 5).
This tended to make ￿nancial conditions even more favourable for a broad range of borrowers.
Low perceived risk, abundant liquidity and credit expansion, as well as regulatory failures in
some markets, helped feed the house price bubble. Ex-ante real interest rates on 10-year US
government bonds fell below 2 per cent in 2002 and remained there for several years. One
consequence was an increasing search by investors ￿including international banks, non-US
banks and ￿nancial vehicles they controlled ￿for investments with higher risk-return pro￿les.
This stimulated the supply of structured ￿nancial instruments backed mainly, though not
exclusively, by home mortgages often granted with loan-to-value ratios exceeding 100 per
cent, based on the illusion that house prices could only rise. Generally lax ￿nancial regulation,
whose framework did not even encompass some market segments, played a crucial role. In this
environment, housing ￿nance became cheap and attractive, especially variable rate mortgages,
and even more so those with teaser rates. Rates on 30-year ￿xed-rate conventional mortgages
declined to just above 5 per cent in June 2003, with almost 3 per cent annual in￿ ation.
Housing starts jumped by the end of 2003 and the surge in demand propelled housing prices.
The increased ability of households to borrow against their growing home equity was crucial
in boosting consumer spending on goods and services as well as housing.
5. Eventually, supply bottlenecks formed in world commodity markets, US monetary policy was
gradually tightened, and house prices peaked (Figure 6), whereupon the large risk exposures
that had accumulated in the ￿nancial system suddenly became apparent and ￿nancial tur-
moil ensued. In fact, the strong expansion of global demand had been accompanied by a
rapid increase in the demand for energy and other commodities, particularly in fast-growing
emerging economies. Over time, this added to in￿ ationary pressures, and monetary policy
in the advanced economies had to be tightened. By late 2006 the rise in US interest rates
had induced ￿rst a loss of momentum and then a turnaround in house prices. This triggered
a domino e⁄ect, starting with the structured products based on subprime mortgages. In
the summer of 2007 the world economy entered a period of acute ￿nancial turmoil, which,
despite central banks￿prompt and massive response, gradually turned into a global crisis af-
fecting whole industries and economies. The earlier increase in leverage and the various kinds
of pro-cyclicality that characterize the behaviour of ￿nancial systems ampli￿ed the race to
deleverage and exacerbated the resulting credit crunch. With the collapse of Lehman Broth-
ers in September 2008, the worst global crisis since the Great Depression became a stark
reality.
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15As is clear from this simpli￿ed overview, two central elements of the story are: (a) an over-
expansionary monetary and regulatory stance in the United States, which permitted a protracted,
debt-￿nance consumer spending boom; and (b) the decision of China and other emerging countries
to pursue an export-led growth strategy supported by pegging their currencies to the US dollar,
resulting in a huge build-up of their o¢ cial reserves, in conjunction with sluggish domestic demand
in surplus advanced economies characterized by low potential output growth.
Both policies were attractive in the short run but ultimately unsustainable. In order to assess
their respective contributions, in what follows we perform a series of counterfactual exercises using
NiGEM, a large-scale world macroeconometric model, whose characteristics are described in the
following section.
4 Overview of the model and simulation design
In NiGEM, for most OECD countries there is a speci￿c model containing the determinants of
domestic demand, export and import volumes, prices, current accounts and net assets. The rest
of the world is modelled through regional blocks: Latin America, Africa, East Asia, Developing
Europe, OPEC and a Miscellaneous group comprising mainly countries in West Asia. The non-
OECD models are less detailed than the OECD ones.
The core of each of these country models consists of a production function determining
output in the long term; a wage-price block; a description of the government sector; consumption,
personal income and wealth; international trade; and ￿nancial markets. A dynamic error-correction
structure is used for the estimated equations, which allows the model to adjust gradually towards
equilibrium in response to a shock. In some cases the speed of adjustment depends on expectations
as well as the distance from equilibrium. In the steady-state equilibrium, output depends on the
production function underlying the model, and the output gap is the deviation of actual from
equilibrium output.
Cross-country linkages in NiGEM take place through trade and competitiveness, ￿nancial
market interactions and international stocks of assets. The model is homogeneous in exchange
rates, and demand for exports equals imports across the world. Price competitiveness acts as an
important stabilizing feedback on the model, as shifts in domestic price levels or the exchange rate
feed into relative trade prices, allowing net trade to o⁄set shifts in domestic demand.
Countries are also linked via their ￿nancial markets, as the model describes the structure and
composition of ￿nancial net worth, emphasizing the role and origin of foreign assets and liabilities
as well as the distinction between equity, bond and bank-based assets.
The value of wealth depends on expectations, since bond prices re￿ ect long-term interest
rates, which are the forward convolution of short-term interest rates, and equity prices depend
16on expected future pro￿ts. A method is therefore needed to solve for their current and future
values. The extended path method of Fair and Taylor (1983) is used to obtain values for future and
current expectations and iterate along solution paths. Expectations are repeatedly recalculated
until convergence is achieved.
In what follows several shocks are applied to the model. We assume that agents have full
knowledge of the vector of model parameter estimates, future values of the exogenous values are
available and all lagged values are known. Agents know the set of shocks and when solving for the
dynamic path of the endogenous variables they set all future shocks equal to their expected value
of zero (the certainty equivalence assumption is assumed to hold). The model is solved far enough
into the future so that the results are not a⁄ected by the terminal date. Terminal conditions are
standard, and embed steady-state properties where appropriate.
Where NiGEM allows us to choose among alternative simulation options, we have adopted
the following ones throughout:
1. Flexible exchange rates are forward looking (and determined according to a UIP con-
dition).
2. Equity prices are forward looking.
3. House prices are backward looking. In the US they are determined according to the
following, estimated, equation, which states that in the long run real house prices are cointegrated
with a measure of the cost of borrowing:
log(PH
t ) = log(PH
t￿1) ￿ 0:125 ￿ [log(PH
t￿1) ￿ log(PC
t￿1) + ￿ ￿ log(rLR
t￿1 + ￿t￿1 + 0:05)]
where PH is the house price index, PC is the consumption de￿ ator, ￿ is the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labour in the production function (set at 0.5), rLR is the forward
real long-term interest rate, and ￿ is the wedge between lending and borrowing rates for households.
4. Long-term real rates are forward looking. Nominal long-term rates are modelled as a
convolution of expected short-term rates plus a term spread.
5. Consumption is backward looking in all countries; we experimented with forward-
looking consumption without obtaining signi￿cantly di⁄erent results.5 In both forward and backward-
looking consumption equations there is a share of liquidity-constrained consumers, which varies
across countries. For example, in the United States it is calibrated to around 15 per cent; it is
higher in most other industrialized countries.
5As expected, results are slightly more frontloaded with forward-looking consumption, even if the speed of con-
vergence of simulations is much faster with backward-looking consumption.
176. The in￿ ation rate included as an argument of the monetary policy targeting rules is
forward looking.
7. Interest rates are determined endogenously and follow di⁄erent monetary policy target-
ing rules. In particular, the United States follows a standard Taylor rule. Monetary policies in the
other countries follow a 2-pillar ￿in￿ ation and nominal GDP ￿rule (the euro area, United King-
dom, Russia, Canada, Australia, India, Korea, New Zealand, Taiwan and South Africa) or shadow
the policies adopted by some other countries (e.g. China￿ s policy shadows the policy adopted by
the US so as to peg its currency to the United States; most non-euro-area European countries
shadow the ECB￿ s 2-pillar strategy). The notable exception is Japan, which follows a price-level
targeting rule in order to prevent de￿ ation from leading to real interest rates that are lower than
growth rates and hence to explosive paths for the Japanese economy.
8. A ￿scal solvency condition is imposed, which stabilizes the budget de￿cit (as a per-
centage of GDP) with respect to some target de￿cit.
9. All individual country models are allowed to respond endogenously to the various
shocks that are imposed in the di⁄erent simulation exercises.
5 Counterfactuals
Following the narrative described in Section 3, we concentrate on the period 2002-07.6 One crucial
element concerns how to deal with the ￿conundrum￿ of the apparent lack of sensitivity of US
long-term interest rates to the gradual rise in short rates, which surprised many observers as it
was in sharp contrast with interest rate behaviour during past policy tightening cycles (Greenspan,
2005). Many interpretations (see Rudebusch, Sack and Swanson, 2007, for a survey) have traced it
to a decline in the term premium. For instance, Kim and Wright (2005) estimated a three-factor
a¢ ne model of the yield curve and found that the risk premium on ten-year bonds fell by 0.8
percentage points between 2004 and 2005.7 As noted by Kohn (2005), the decline in term premia
in the Treasury market may have contributed to keeping long-term interest rates relatively low and,
consequently, may have supported the housing sector and consumer spending more generally.
In the counterfactuals we follow Craine and Martin (2009) and attribute half of the decline
in the term premium to the increase in foreign holdings of Treasury debt. This may be viewed as a
conservative assumption with respect to the ￿ndings of Warnock and Warnock (2006), who estimate
that increased foreign demand in 2004-05 kept the ten-year Treasury yield 0.9 percentage points
6By contrast, Barrell et al. (2008), who also use the NiGEM to simulate a scenario of global imbalances correction
via demand rebalancing, take 2007 as the starting point. Their scenario is centred on a large US dollar depreciation
driven by a rise in risk premia on US assets, with no exogenous change in US monetary policy.
7This estimate is remarkably similar to that obtained by Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004). It is slightly higher
than the estimate by Rudebusch and Wu (2007) and lower than that by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005).
18lower than it would otherwise have been. But other studies ￿nd that foreign o¢ cial purchases of
Treasury securities play little or no role in explaining the decline in long-term Treasury yields (e.g.
Wu, 2008). As suggested by Rudebusch (2010), with the bene￿t of hindsight, it now appears that
the ￿conundrum￿was part of a broader global credit boom characterized by an underpricing of
many types of risk, especially for ￿xed-income securities. Indeed, monetary policy actions may
have a⁄ected the risk-taking capacity of banks, leading to shifts in the supply of credit (Adrian and
Shin, 2008, 2009). Therefore, when we assume a more restrictive monetary policy, we also assume
that tighter liquidity conditions would have reduced the appetite for risk (or the search for yield),
resulting in higher term premia.
5.1 Was US monetary policy too expansionary for too long in the wake of the
2001 recession? Would a tighter monetary stance have prevented (or at
least contained) the housing bubble?
The counterfactual simulation (scenario A) carried out to answer this question is closely modelled
on that proposed by Taylor (2007), which assumes that the federal funds rate followed a Taylor rule,
smoothed to have the 25-basis-point increments used by the Fed in those years. So the policy rate
is assumed to be raised by 25 basis points per quarter, from 1.75 per cent in 2002Q1 to 5.25 per cent
in 2005Q3; it then follows the baseline until 2007Q4, after which it is allowed to be endogenously
determined. In reality, the federal funds rate was initially lowered to 1 per cent and did not start to
be raised until 2004Q2, reaching 5.25 per cent only in mid-2006. We further assume that the term
premium on long-term US interest rates increases by 40 basis points by 2005; we assume that the
risk premium also increases in the rest of the world.8 This second assumption can be justi￿ed as
re￿ ecting the indirect e⁄ect of tighter US policy on global liquidity conditions and, by that channel,
on risk premia in general (thus removing one possible source of the ￿conundrum￿ ).
Results: Tighter monetary policy leads to lower output (by about one and half percentage
points after two years) and lower price level (5 percentage points by the fourth year). Nominal
house prices are dampened by more than 4 per cent with respect to the baseline, but because the
general price level falls by more than that, the e⁄ect on real house prices is expansionary.9 The
tighter monetary policy leads, on impact, to a strengthening of the dollar￿ s e⁄ective exchange rate.
The US current account balance (as a percentage of GDP) initially deteriorates before improving
modestly with respect to the baseline by end-2007.
8For example, the increase is equal to 40 basis points in the euro area and somewhat lower (25 basis points) in
Japan.
9Del Negro and Otrok (2007) calculate that expansionary monetary policy accounts for less than one percentage
point of the average growth rate in real housing prices in 2001-05 (6 percent per year). Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
estimate that between 1998 and 2005 monetary policy can account for 2.1 percentage points of the increase in real
house prices in excess of a deterministic trend (cumulatively equal to 13.9 percentage points).
19Overall, it appears that the tighter US monetary policy suggested by Taylor (2007), coupled
with an increase in the term premium on long bonds, would have not avoided the house price
bubble and would have produced at most a small dent in the US external de￿cit. However, it
can be argued that a large component of the appreciation of housing prices came through self-
ful￿lling expectations of price increases, in which case the e⁄ect of monetary policy on housing
prices reported above would just represent a lower bound, since the equation that describes the
evolution of housing prices does not incorporate such a mechanism. In fact, in a model that allows
for self-ful￿lling expectations, a front-loading of the monetary restriction could have signi￿cantly
dampened the prospect of future price growth.
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5.2 Would stricter ￿nancial supervision or the use of a macro-prudential policy
instrument, acting via the cost of credit, have helped prevent or contain
the housing bubble?
As in the analysis conducted by the IMF (2009), the model is insu¢ ciently rich to specify the nature
of banking supervisory or macro-prudential tools explicitly (banks are not explicitly modelled, for
example). So we assume that the policymaker had access to an instrument that a⁄ects mortgage
credit spreads directly. This is a simple shortcut intended to mimic the e⁄ects of, say, regulations
that require banks to set aside more capital as asset prices rise, thus raising the margin that banks
have to charge over funding costs. We maintain that it is equivalent, for instance, to regulatory
20limits on loan-to-value ratios.
In counterfactual scenario B the credit spread incorporated in mortgage rates is raised pro-
gressively by 1.5 percentage points in 2003Q1-2004Q2, and by an additional 0.5 percentage point
until 2006Q1; it is then assumed to return to the baseline by early-2007.10 The cost of capital for
the business sector is not directly a⁄ected. This policy shock is calibrated so as to keep the cost
of mortgages in 2002-07 close to the average recorded in the 1990s. Monetary policy is allowed to
follow the baseline.
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Results: Because this macro-prudential tool is speci￿cally targeted to the mortgage market,
it a⁄ects real house prices but has a limited (and only indirect) impact on other macroeconomic
variables. The e⁄ect on real house prices is signi￿cant: by 2007 they are more than 5 per cent
lower with respect to the baseline. The e⁄ect on nominal prices is slightly greater (-7 per cent),
but is partly o⁄set by lower in￿ ation, which is the result of this policy￿ s dampening e⁄ect, via
a negative wealth e⁄ect, on consumption demand and output. The improvement in the current
account balance is minimal ￿about 0.2 percentage points of GDP by 2007.
10Such a path for the lending wedge was designed to increase the cost of mortgages when housing prices were
increasing particularly fast.
215.3 Would the combination of monetary policy tightening (perhaps somewhat
less aggressive than in the ￿rst exercise) and a macro-prudential tool have
been e⁄ective in dampening house prices?
Counterfactual scenario C combines the main features of the previous two scenarios, with some
modi￿cations designed to avoid the de￿ ationary impact of scenario A while enhancing the e⁄ect
on housing markets. The policy tightening is assumed to begin one year later (2003Q1), with the
federal funds target starting from a lower initial level (1.5 per cent) and reaching 3.75 per cent in
2005Q2; the policy rate is then allowed to remain constant for other two quarters, when it crosses
the baseline, and to be determined afterwards by a Taylor rule. Until 2005Q4, this path for the
federal funds rate is very similar to the path that would have been obtained had the Fed followed
a Taylor rule using real-time data on changes in the GDP de￿ ator as the in￿ ation measure (as
in the original Taylor rule speci￿cation), as suggested by Papell (2010). The term premium also
increases, as in scenario A. In addition, the credit premium on mortgage rates is increased starting
in 2003Q1, as in scenario B.
Results: The dampening e⁄ect on house prices is stronger: at their peak in 2007 real house
prices are about 6 per cent lower than in the baseline. The cumulative adverse e⁄ect on output
is slightly more than 1 per cent by the third year of the simulation. On the other hand, the
disin￿ ationary e⁄ect obtained in the ￿rst scenario is now much more muted. The current account
balance improves by almost half a percentage point of GDP, re￿ ecting both the increase in domestic
saving and the depreciation of the dollar.
This scenario suggests that an appropriate combination of tighter US monetary policy and
additional credit restraint resulting from an aggressive use of macro-prudential policy tools could
have dampened the housing boom (cutting the total rise in real house prices between 2002 and
2006 by one-third) and would have made a dent in the US external imbalance. However, this
would have been achieved at the cost of somewhat lower output. Moreover, the improvement in
the current account de￿cit, though not trivial, would have presumably been too small to eliminate
the risk of a disorderly correction. The decline of activity in the United States would have spilled
over to the other main areas, where GDP falls permanently below the baseline. To avoid such an
outcome, these economies would have had to implement policies to cope with the adverse e⁄ect
of the shortfall in their external demand.11 Therefore, we turn next to exercises that include a
rebalancing of demand outside the United States.
11In the simulation, the only o⁄setting endogenous policy changes allowed are to monetary policy. After three
years it becomes more expansionary in Europe and Japan, where it soon hits the zero lower bound.
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5.4 What would have been the e⁄ect on US housing prices and America￿ s cur-
rent account imbalance of an increase in potential output in Japan and
Europe and a major rebalancing toward domestic demand (with an appre-
ciation of the currencies that were being pegged to the dollar) in emerging
Asia?
In counterfactual scenario D we assume that major advanced economies su⁄ering from particularly
sluggish growth enact supply-side reforms that enhance their potential output; this would also
endogenously boost their domestic demand. Speci￿cally, in Japan and the three major euro-area
countries (Germany, France and Italy) we would ideally want to assume a productivity enhancement
in nontradables (e.g. Koske and W￿rg￿tter, 2010). This, in turn, would augment domestic demand
via wealth e⁄ects. However, since NiGEM is a one-good model, we take a short-cut and increase
potential output directly. The size of the shock is calibrated so as to raise potential output growth
to 2.5 per cent in 2002-07, which is roughly equal to potential output growth in the United States
in the same period.12 Thereafter, counterfactual potential growth is assumed to stabilize gradually
at an average between the United States￿and the country￿ s baseline potential growth. Ultimately,
over the entire period, potential output growth exceeds the baseline by 0.7 percentage points in
Japan, 0.5 points in Germany and 0.3 points in France and Italy.
12Country risk premia are assumed to remain at average levels recorded in 1991-2001.
23In emerging countries, instead, we assume a broad range of economic reforms ￿macro-￿scal
management, governance ￿that directly rebalance growth towards domestic demand. In particular,
in China and other surplus emerging Asian economies, domestic demand is assumed to shift upwards
between 2002Q1 and 2007Q4 by an amount equal to net exports; after that, it is allowed to revert
very gradually to the baseline. These assumptions are meant to capture a genuine rebalancing
towards domestic demand, carried out through enhanced welfare state reforms aimed at reducing
precautionary saving (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2006, Baldacci et al., 2010) or corporate governance
reforms able to reduce ￿rms￿retained earnings.
At the same time, in China and other surplus emerging Asian economies the path of the
exchange rate is calibrated so as to ensure that the counterfactual path of output and in￿ ation
remains as close as possible to the baseline.13 In other words, a real appreciation is engineered to
ensure that the excess domestic demand is directed towards imports and domestic macroeconomic
balance is maintained. In Japan and the euro area, which like all advanced economies have a fully
modelled monetary policy reaction function in NiGEM, the reaction of the exchange rate occurs
endogenously, though with some lags, via the induced changes in monetary policy rates.
Finally, we also assume an increase in the term premium on US bonds of 0.4 percentage
points starting from 2004. Given the other assumed policy changes, this should re￿ ect the lower
demand for US Treasuries coming from o¢ cial authorities, consistent with the estimates of Craine
and Martin (2009). As in scenarios A and C, we assume that the term premium also increases in
the rest of the world.
This scenario is designed to assess the ￿global savings glut￿hypothesis, which asserts that if
the surplus countries had saved less, US monetary policy could have been tighter, US consumers
would not have needed to act as ￿consumers of last resort￿and global interest rates would have
been higher. Thus, according to this view, both the large global imbalances and asset price bubbles
could have been signi￿cantly reduced.
Results: In the United States, the global shock forces monetary policy to be more restrictive
than in the baseline, by about three-quarters of a percentage point in the ￿rst 3 years. The
dampening e⁄ect on real house prices reaches 3 per cent by end-2007. The shocks drive real interest
rates permanently higher. US consumers react to the negative wealth e⁄ect on asset prices (due
to higher real rates) and also to the fall in their incomes, and immediately reduce their spending.
As a result, US output falls, and although growth rates later return close to the baseline, the
decline in the output level is permanent. In addition, the US price level increases permanently,
although in￿ ation returns to the baseline after 3 years. Higher demand for US exports and the fall
in domestic demand, together with the depreciation of the dollar (by about 2 per cent on impact
and almost 4 per cent by end-2007), cause the US current account balance to improve by more
than 1 percentage point of GDP by end-2007.
13This allows, among other things, for an appreciation of the renminbi vis-￿-vis the U.S. dollar by an amount
cumulatively slightly larger than 20 per cent.
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25These stag￿ ationary e⁄ects are also due to the increase in the oil price induced by the re-
balancing of global demand towards oil-consumption-intensive countries (especially China). In fact
the oil price increases by 3 per cent in US dollars relative to the baseline in the ￿rst year and then
progressively rises (following the evolution of world demand) to 9 per cent above the baseline after
10 years.
In Japan, the higher potential output deepens de￿ ation on impact, but just slightly. The
expansionary e⁄ect of the increase in domestic demand is only partially o⁄set by the fall in equity
prices, due to expectations of a long-lasting monetary tightening (even though the actual policy
tightening occurs only several years later, since policy rates were initially above the desired level
owing to the zero lower bound). Thus, the deviation of output from the baseline is substantial.
The large increase in domestic absorption causes the current account surplus to shrink relative to
the baseline by almost 2 percentage points of GDP by 2007.
In Germany too, the shock to potential output pushes in￿ ation slightly below the baseline.
Output growth jumps above the baseline on impact and then slows down, but remains persistently
above the base. For the euro area as a whole, the net e⁄ects are more limited (output rises
permanently above the baseline, by 1 percentage point by end-2007). Germany￿ s external surplus
shrinks by 1.3 percentage points of GDP by 2007. The euro area￿ s external balance changes very
little.
In China, output remains close to the baseline, as the domestic demand shock is o⁄set by
the exchange rate appreciation; the (calibrated) renminbi appreciation required to do that is on
impact, relative to the baseline, of the order of 6 per cent with respect to the US dollar and a little
more than 20 per cent by end-2007 (but just 10 per cent in real e⁄ective terms). The reduction in
China￿ s current account surplus is small initially, but increases progressively after 2004 and exceeds
5 percentage points of GDP by 2007.
5.5 Would the combination of tighter US monetary and supervisory policies
and a major demand rebalancing (and currency appreciation) in surplus
economies have addressed both the US domestic imbalance and global im-
balances simultaneously?
Scenario E combines the changes introduced in scenarios C and D: in addition to a monetary
tightening and a credit tightening via macro-prudential policy tools in the United States, there is
a large increase in potential output in Japan and the larger-euro area countries and a rebalancing
towards domestic demand, accompanied by an exogenous currency appreciation, in China and
other Asian surplus economies that peg to the dollar. Furthermore, due to the tighter policy stance
in the United States and the reduced demand for US Treasuries coming from o¢ cial authorities,
from 2004 onwards the term premium on long-term bonds increases everywhere by 0.8 percentage
26points.14
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Results: In the United States, the contractionary e⁄ect of tighter monetary policy is com-
pounded by the increase in real interest rates due to the global demand shock and the higher term
premium. Accordingly, output falls by more than in than in both scenarios C and D (about 3
percentage points relative to the baseline by 2005). The increase in the price level is transitory and
disappears after the third year of the simulation.
The e⁄ect on real house prices is substantial: by end-2006 they are 8 percentage points lower
than the baseline. Their cumulative increase between end-2001 and the peak (2006Q4) is cut by
11 percentage points relative to the baseline (from 31 to 20 per cent). This means that while real
house prices actually increased by almost 4 per cent per year in the six years between 2002 and
2007, according to the counterfactual in the same period they would have increased by 2.7 per cent
per year, which is much closer to the average annual growth in the previous decade (2.2 per cent,
Figure 13, left-hand panel).
The improvement in the US current account de￿cit comes to 1.6 percentage points relative to
GDP by end-2007. The implied real depreciation of the dollar amounts to less than 5 percentage
points by end-2007. The improvement in the current account also continues in the remaining years
of the simulation exercise, when it exceeds 2 percentage points.
14Except in Japan, where the increase in the term premium is assumed to be somewhat smaller (50 basis points).
27In the rest of the world, the e⁄ects on output and on current account imbalances are not
substantially di⁄erent from those described under scenario D, with a somewhat larger current
account adjustment in Japan. As a consequence, in 2001-07 the dispersion of current account
balances ￿measured as the sum of the absolute values of the current account balances of the US,
Japan, Germany and China (G4) scaled by world GDP ￿would have remained almost ￿ at, whereas
it actually doubled (Figure 13, right-hand panel). As in the previous scenario, monetary policies
and real exchange rates are little changed both in Europe and Japan.
Figure 13: Scenario E (US real housing prices and dispersion in current account balances)
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Was the Great Recession avoidable? It is probably impossible to tell, but this paper shows that
with a di⁄erent set of economic policies in various areas of the world the global environment could
have been substantially di⁄erent. In particular, had monetary and supervision policies been less
expansionary in the United States, had policies enhancing potential output growth been imple-
mented in Japan and Europe, and had policies conducive to rebalancing towards domestic demand
been pursued in emerging Asian economies, in combination with enough exchange rate ￿ exibility
to maintain domestic balance, the pattern of current accounts would have been considerably more
balanced and US housing prices would have grown at a much slower pace. For the United States,
the cost of these policies would have been lower output and temporarily higher in￿ ation, but the
loss in output (less than 3 percentage points below the baseline in 2006) is half as big as the output
loss at the trough of the recession (6 percentage points relative to the pre-crisis trend in 2009Q2).
All in all, the slower US GDP growth could be viewed as an insurance premium for avoiding the
costs of the recession and the subsequent large increase in public debt in order to o⁄set the weakness
in private demand and the e⁄ects of ￿nancial sector deleveraging. For the other major economies
the rebalancing of global demand, through a shift towards greater reliance on domestic demand
in China and an increase in potential output growth in Europe and Japan, would have compen-
sated the slowdown induced by tighter US monetary and supervision policies, helping markedly to
mitigate the international distortions that facilitated the build-up of the crisis.
28The fundamental macroeconomic imbalances that lay at the root of the ￿nancial turmoil have
not being righted by the consequent global recession. After a temporary narrowing induced by the
rise in US private sector saving and the sharp fall in investment, partly o⁄set by a larger public sector
de￿cit, the US current account de￿cit is again on the rise according to IMF projections. Exchange
rate movements have not generally supported the correction of imbalances. In e⁄ective terms the
dollar is stronger than it was in July 2007. This scenario is complicated by the huge accumulation
of public debt, which could lead to higher borrowing costs if markets became concerned about its
sustainability, and the protracted period of very low policy interest rates and abundant liquidity,
which could end up fuelling new asset price bubbles, thus creating the conditions for the next crisis.
The importance of achieving a major rebalancing of global demand through policies aimed
at a more sustainable pattern of growth has not been reduced with the crisis.
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